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The Australian superannuation system has been praised 
as one of the best in the world. Yet a major review by the 
Cooper Committee in 2010 found numerous problems that 
have been undermining the performance of the system, 
proposing a number of recommendations for 
improvement. The subsequent adoption and 
implementation of two such recommendations saw the 
introduction of ‘MySuper’ and ‘SuperStream’ by the 
government resulting in the most significant reform in the 
superannuation industry since the introduction of the 
Superannuation Guarantee (SG) in 1992. This paper 
critically analyses: the relevant Deloitte; and Financial 
Services Council and Ernst and Young’s report used in 
support of this major reform. It is concluded that the scope 
of these studies is limited and they are predominantly 
constrained to industry funds and are presented by 
interested players, limiting their ability for full 
representation. A call for independent academic research 
is made. 
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“My kind of loyalty was loyalty to one's country, not to its institutions or its office-
holders. The country is the real thing, the substantial thing, the eternal thing; it is the 
thing to watch over, and care for, and be loyal to; institutions are extraneous, they are 
its mere clothing, and clothing can wear out...” 





Australia’s superannuation system is listed as the fourth largest superannuation 
system in the world (Mason, Walker et al. 2013) with assets in excess of $1.6 trillion 
as of June 2013 (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2013), and has been 
praised as one of the best systems in existence. Despite this praise, a major review 
of the system was commissioned in May of 2009 following concerns over the losses 
experienced post the global financial crisis (GFC), and the high levels of fees 
charged by superannuation fund providers (Lateline 2009). It was perceived that 
Australia’s superannuation system, having such a high asset base, may need to 
consider the potential impact of the GFC. 
 
 
The review committee, chaired by Jeremy Cooper, was charged with the 
responsibility of examining the governance, efficiency, structure and operation of the 
superannuation system, with the best interests of the members as its focal point 
(Super System Review 2010). The committee, in its final report, put forward 177 
recommendations, 139 of which were subsequently either fully supported, or 
supported in principle by the then government (Stronger Super 2011). This resulted 
in significant reforms.  This paper is specifically interested in the core 
recommendations for the establishment of MySuper and SuperStream, and how 
these reforms came about. 
 
 
At the core of the recommendations was the proposal to establish a low cost, 
privately managed fund which would be available to all members. Titled MySuper, 
the proposed fund would consist of a “…single, diversified portfolio of investments for 
the vast majority of Australian workers…who are in the default option in their current 
fund” (Super System Review 2010, p.11). The projected savings through reduced 
fees and charges was assessed to be $400 million per year (Super System Review 
2010), based on the balance of funds invested in default investment options. This 
balance of funds was $340 billion of the total $560 billion invested in default funds 
(Super System Review 2010). The savings estimates were based on a report 
prepared by Deloitte, detailing the result of their investigation into the costing 
projections of the proposed MySuper fund. These saving estimates have been the 
main justification for the implementation of MySuper. In its final report, the Cooper 
Committee1 translated such savings into reduced fees, and therefore improved 
returns for fund members who would be moved from the previous default funds into 
the new simple, low-cost MySuper funds. Therefore the Deloitte report is an 
important document to consider as its findings had policy implications for super funds 




The other significant recommendation of the review focused on funds’ efficiency and 
the quality of their reporting.  It was recommended superannuation funds make 
greater use of technology in their back office administration to improve these aspects 
(Super System Review 2010). Their use of manual processing was believed to be a 
significant cost to members both in the timeliness of their reporting, and financially.  
Such costs could be avoided using computerised processes that have the ability to 
identify members through the use of their tax file number (Super System Review 
2010). Research conducted jointly by Financial Services Council (FSC) and Ernst & 
Young (2010) estimated the outcome of implementing SuperStream to be a savings 
in operating costs of $1 billion per year reaching $20 billion over a ten year period2. A 
contentious assumption made in this projection was that the funds under 
management would continue to grow at the same rate as they had done in the past. 
 
 
The combined savings to be brought about by the proposed introduction of MySuper 
and SuperStream to the entire system were estimated to be $1.55 billion per year in 
the short term and $2.7 billion per year in the long term (Super System Review 
2010). An ‘average’ superannuation fund member is estimated to pay 40% less fees 
in the long term, adding a total of $40,000 to their superannuation fund after 37 




The projected benefits to members promised by the savings are compelling, and 
given the impact on policy they are significant. However, such savings are 
projections and estimates based on a series of assumptions which need closer 
scrutiny. This paper examines the basis of such projections through an analysis of 
two research reports; one produced by Deloitte on the impact of MySuper; and the 
other prepared jointly by FSC and Ernst and Young on the impact of SuperStream.  
 
 
This paper is structured as follows: section two positions this paper in the extant 
literature; section three outlines the methodological approach taken and sources of 
data; section four offers an analysis and discussion of the data, while section five 
draws a summary and presents concluding arguments. 
 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
There is a dearth of academic literature on the superannuation industry and its 
regulation. The Australian Government’s policy on superannuation is fundamental to 
the discharge of its social welfare policy and a key strategic initiative for a nation with 
an increase in the average age of its population.  Despite the impact that 
superannuation policy decisions could have on the retirement savings of every 
Australian worker as well as the Australian economy as a whole, little interest to date 
has been shown by academics in critical analysis of these major reforms and policy 
processes. The very few identified studies that are relevant to this paper will be 
briefly discussed.  The literature is classified into three themes: first, arguments 
pertaining to the diversification of funds’ investment portfolios; second, the simplicity 
of the investment strategy of the superannuation fund as a function of the members’ 
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competencies; and third, the costs of implementing new regulations and related 
infrastructure costs of MySuper.  
 
 
2.1 Diversification of investments  
 
An early study by Sy (2009) used statistical modeling to calculate returns for passive 
versus active management of funds.  This study concluded that a simple universal 
default option would be optimal for most investors due to the reduced costs of 




In a study with contrary findings to Sy (2009), Basu and Drew (2010) examined the 
appropriateness of a default investment option in defined contribution plans.  
Statistical models were applied to compare the simulated performance of a default 
investment option (having the least percentage of funds invested in stocks), to other 
funds (having higher percentage of funds invested in stocks). The study found that 
investment portfolios with more stock investments tended to be safer compared to 
those with more fixed interest securities indicative of the default investment options. 
Basu and Drew (2010) argue that Australians whose superannuation funds are 
invested in a diversified default investment option would be better off having all their 
funds in stocks. This finding is supported in part by industry (see Barrymore 2010; 
Stewart 2011). It must be noted, however, that the wealth projections simulated in 
this study were based on past performance of the stock market and bond market 
which may not be experienced in the future. Basu and Drew’s (2010) findings are 
inconsistent with the proposed MySuper model which is to be a diversified, simple 
and low cost product. Therefore the diversification of investments is an important 
criterion against which to consider MySuper. 
 
 
2.2 Simplicity of investment strategy 
 
The simplicity of MySuper is more a view of the members’ investment competence 
(or literacy) than an argument for a simple model. The MySuper proposal was made 
based on the view that most fund members are not sophisticated investors and do 
not get involved in managing their superannuation investments (Ingles and Fear 
2009; Gruen and Wong 2010). Supporting this view is the evidence provided in 
research conducted by the Australia Institute following the implementation of the 
choice of fund legislation in July 2005 (Fear 2008; Fear and Pace 2008). Consumers 
were found to avoid making financial decisions when faced with numerous options.  
Information overload was found to result in a failure in the intention of the choice of 







2.3 Regulatory structure  
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The regulatory structure of the Australian Superannuation Fund is viewed to have 
been “…developed in an ad hoc manner and largely in response to various public 
demands for regulation” (Cortese, Aylward et al. 2006, p.32). Despite arguments to 
simplify legislation, the Australian regulation including the licensing and 
implementation of MySuper adds to the previously complex system, according to 
Taylor (2011). It is argued that multitudes of regulatory changes, particularly 
licensing reforms, over time have cost fund members between 1.26 to 1.35 percent 
of the superannuation assets (Taylor 2011).  Any inadequacy or flaw of the licensing 
regime will have major consequences for MySuper’s projected cost savings (Taylor 
2011). Since 80% of superannuation assets will be invested in MySuper products 
(Washington in Taylor 2011) the infrastructure costs may well cancel any expected 
relief in fees. For example, the lack of differential pricing under the proposed 
MySuper model is claimed to increase fees for approximately 6% of Australian 
workers (750,000 workers) rather than reducing them as it has been promised 
(Chant West 2011). This occurs as a result of the subsidization of the costs of 
running smaller funds by those of the larger funds within the MySuper structure 
(Chant West 2011). 
 
 
It is argued that regulation of superannuation is directed more at the industry’s 
agents and their behaviours than at the prudential adequacy of superannuation 
funds. Pender (2010) argues that the focus of the regulation has been on conduct 
rather than structure, with requirements being unnecessarily extensive (Pender 
2010). According to Pender (2010), more structural and capital requirement 
regulation is needed to address the current problems with the system since structural 
regulation affects conduct and therefore performance. Pender (2010) argues that 
even though the terms of reference of the Cooper Review were appropriately worded 
to include a review of both the ‘structure’ and the ‘efficiency’ of the superannuation 
system in the best interests of its members, the committee has failed in the 
implementation of these terms of reference. Rather than considering the impact of 
the current regulatory system on the formation of the industry structure and 
ultimately the member returns, the review has focused on reducing the ‘intermediary’ 
costs as a way of improving member returns (Pender 2010). 
 
 
Pender (2010, p.46) believes that “Poor investments, done cheaply, do not result in a 
good outcome”, arguing that reforms should focus on changing the features of the 
financial system which have resulted in the shift of investment capital away from 
businesses. Examples of such features include negative gearing, no tax on the 
family home, tax preferred capital gains and agricultural concessions (Pender 2010). 
Business investments (such as bank deposits and shares) are thought to ultimately 
result in higher returns (by facilitating growth for businesses) and therefore provide 
growth in super funds (Pender 2010).  Therefore, while Pender (2010) supports the 
review’s proposal to upgrade the technological aspect of the back office services 
(SuperStream), he views that MySuper default funds only add more complexity to 




From the above discussion we can conclude that with respect to the diversification of 
superannuation investments, studies to date provide no definitive results with respect 
to the benefits of a universal default fund such as MySuper.  In reference to the 
appropriate level of complexity of a default fund, the literature suggests that rather 
than being solely a technical problem, policy pertaining to MySuper should make 
reference to social aspects as its outcomes are a function of members’ investment 
competency. The literature also signals that the costs of implementing regulation and 
associated infrastructure costs necessary to the operation of MySuper may outweigh 
the anticipated financial benefits for its members. 
 
 
3. Methodology and Empirics 
 
This study uses a qualitative approach of a case study (Neuman 2011) of the 
Australian Federal Government’s initiatives of MySuper and SuperStream. This study 
addresses the research question what are the assumptions underlying the projected 
savings from the adoption of MySuper and SuperStream? This question comes from 
the literature, and is put forward as a criterion against which the two reports will be 
analysed. This analysis is discursive in nature.  
 
 
The method of this study is an analysis involving a close reading of two primary 
source documents as the empirics for this analysis: the Deloitte Report (2010) 
“Super System Review: Default Fund costs under the MySuper proposals” (hereafter 
termed Deloitte Report), and the Financial Services Council and Ernst and Young 
Report (2010) “The $20 billion prize: An industry blueprint to implement 
SuperStream” (hereafter termed FSC & EY Report).  These documents are worthy of 
analysis because their recommendations are the basis on which government policy 
for the Australian superannuation industry has been formulated.  Assumptions made 
deferential to the financial services industry have implications for the wider public 
interest and the long term stability of the Australian economy. 
 
 
4. Analysis and discussion 
 
4.1 The Deloitte Report 
 
Deloitte Actuaries and Consultants was commissioned by the Cooper Committee to 
do a projection of what would be ‘reasonable costs’ that a large default 
superannuation fund within the proposed MySuper model could charge members 
with account balances of $25,000 (Super System Review). Costs were projected for 
various fund sizes and various investment strategies (Deloitte 2010). These 









Figure 1: Estimated total annual percentage costs for MySuper products of varying 
sizes (investment costs, plus operating costs and intra‐fund advice) 
 
MySuper fund size/investment strategy $2b $5b $10B $20b 
Passive balanced 0.60% 0.46% 0.38% 0.32% 
Passive conservative 0.58% 0.45% 0.37% 0.32% 
Active balanced 0.94% 0.83% 0.70% 0.60% 
Active conservative 0.80% 0.70% 0.59% 0.49% 
Active balanced (with alternatives) 1.04% 0.89% 0.77% 0.66% 
Active conservative (with alternatives) 0.89% 0.76% 0.64% 0.54% 
Source: Cooper Review Super System Review: Final Report – Part 1 – Review and Recommendations, p.19. 
 
 
4.1.1 Assumed features for MySuper 
 
Key features of MySuper as well as the licensing conditions placed on MySuper 
providers are used to guide the costing estimates. 
 
 




 Separate accounting and reporting’ Streamlined member reporting and 
disclosures; 
 An obligation to accept all types of contributions; 
 A single investment option is to be offered; 
 Limits to cross-subsidies; 
 Exclusion of bundled advice, but access to general and intra-fund advice in 
accordance with ASIC RG 200; 
 No trailing commissions or ongoing advice payments; 
 Basic insurance can be offered but with no commission or like payments; 
 Certain requirements surrounding fees: 
o No entry fees 
o Buy/sell spreads demonstrably linked to costs 
o No non-explicit discounts and no rebates 
o Any performance-based fees must comply with Performance Fee 





Although most of the key features point to a reduced fee structure, it can be argued 
that at least two of the licensing conditions would increase the cost of a MySuper 
product, contradictory to its objectives, through additional administration costs that 
will be incurred for meeting these conditions. 
 
 
First is the requirement to have separate accounting and reporting for MySuper 
products. There were as at October 2010, 9.6 million Australians whose 
superannuation investments were in a default fund to be transferred into a MySuper 
fund (Stronger Super 2010). This transfer involves calculation of account balances 
as of the date of transfer, which together with the requirement to separately account 
for and report on the MySuper products will create extensive administration costs. 
Such costs, according to the proposed model, will be borne directly by members 
through a deduction of a set weekly fee (Charaneka and Ebsworth 2013). Magnifying 
these costs is the requirement to have a separate license to offer a MySuper product 
(Newman 2010) and the fact that the details of the requirements are not clear and 
have caused confusion and delays in their implementation (Taylor 2012).  
 
 
Second is the obligation to accept all types of contributions. This feature adds to the 
operational complexity of MySuper funds since different contributions are subjected 
to different taxation and administration rules within the current regulatory framework.  
The overall operational complexity resulting from these requirements together with 
the focus on cost reduction at the expense of innovative investment strategies could 
result in increased fees for MySuper (Rice Warner Actuaries 2012). 
 
 
It is suggested that focused academic research is required so a more accurate 
insight into the ultimate impact of such reforms on fees and performance of MySuper 
funds is gained. 
 
 
4.1.2 Assumed management style 
 
The report makes it explicitly known that although MySuper is to be a “…low-cost, 
no-frills, base superannuation option…” (Deloitte 2010, p.4), trustees can and in fact 
should make decisions which may result in higher costs but are necessary to 
achieve higher returns for the members (Deloitte 2010). For example, the trustees 
may appoint highly paid investment managers or establish high cost diversified funds 
if they ‘strongly’ believe that such decisions will result in higher net returns for the 
members (Deloitte 2010). 
 
 
Our paper argues this assumption highlights the fallacy of the projected lower costs 
argument, due to the unpredictability of the results that such decisions could bring. 
The trustee’s ‘strong belief’ is not a guarantee for higher net results for the members 
and therefore such decisions may result in net losses rather than net returns, as 
experienced throughout the GFC - the very reason why a review was made into the 
superannuation system (see Lateline 2009). 
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4.1.3 Quality and the sources of data used 
 
The Deloitte Report (2010) acknowledged from the outset that: 
 
“It is widely recognised that there is a lack of quality and consistent data 
throughout the superannuation industry in Australia. It is not easy for individual 
Australians, let alone experienced industry practitioners, to compare and 
contrast performance and costs of funds” (Deloitte 2010, p.6). 
 
 
Furthermore, it is stated that: 
 
“The lack of standard (and mandatory) reporting templates means that it is very 
difficult to compare cost structures between funds, between industry sectors and 
over time. This is true of fees, costs and profit margins earned by those who are 
providing services to the industry  
Costs are particularly difficult to assess because the annual reports of 
superannuation funds typically: 
 Only record a small component of total investment related expenses; and 
 Aggregate other expenses into a single amount which may or may not be 
described in the notes. 
Proprietary data does exist within a number of research houses but is rarely 
comprehensive or readily comparable across the entire industry.” 
(Deloitte 2010, p.6) 
 
 
Due to a clear lack of quality data across the industry, the results of a Deloitte 
research report conducted in 20084, adjusted for inflation, were used as the basis of 
operating and investment costs associated with the MySuper default fund. Two 
concerns are raised in this regard. First is that the use of 2008 Deloitte report would 
have limited the analysis in terms of the scope and depth of data used.  According to 
Deloitte (2010), their 2008 report was based on data from industry funds only, due to 
lack of sufficient and consistent data from other types of funds in the industry. 
 
 
Industry funds are the super funds offered by employer groups or unions for the 
benefit of their members (Taylor and Juchau 2013). A specific feature of industry 
funds is that profits made within the fund are used for the benefit of the members 
and are not distributed to owner/managers (Industry Funds Forum Inc.). This feature 
of the funds could have cost implications since it may directly impact trustee conduct 
and decision making. 
 
 
A survey of annual reports of various superannuation funds over a seven year period 
to 2002, suggested that while retail and industry funds incurred higher expenses, 
they underperformed compared to public sector and corporate funds (Coleman, 
Esho et al. 2003). A similar and more recent longitudinal study of the superannuation 
fees by Rice Warner Actuaries (2012) also reported similar results for average fees 
charged by industry funds, despite a 13 basis point decline in fees charged by such 
funds in prior years. 
10 
Given that the structure of MySuper is very similar to that of an industry fund 
(Whiteley 2010), the projected costs should have been closer to the average fees 
charged by industry funds which stood at 1.13% (year to 30 June 2011)  (Rice 
Warner Actuaries 2012). 
 
 
The second concern relates to the possible impact that the GFC could have had on 
operational and investment costs of industry funds since 2008. As the previous 
Deloitte report was prepared based on data collected immediately prior to the GFC 
(Deloitte 2010), the relevance of it to future periods may be questionable even after 
adjustments for inflation are made. 
 
 
Deloitte (2010) has also relied on the ‘experience’ of ‘superannuation practitioners’ 
as another source of data used in their analysis. While the experience of 
practitioners is respectable, it can be biased and very subjective particularly if it is 
not appropriately documented and transparent for future scrutiny. This is more so in 
an industry known for using its lobbying powers only when their self-interest is 
threatened (see Vamos 2012). 
 
 
4.2 FSC & EY Report 
 
The projected benefits of the proposed SuperStream were quantified in a research 
report prepared jointly by the Financial Services Council and Ernst & Young (2010). 
In summary, the research identifies the need for an investment of $1 billion initially to 
establish the streamlined systems but predicts that this investment will provide 
operating cost savings of $1 billion dollars per year, accumulating to $20 billion over 
a ten year period (Financial Services Council and Ernst and Young 2010). 
 
 
These projections were based on a survey of 30 representatives from various 
sectors of the superannuation industry including self-managed super funds 
representing approximately 70% of the superannuation funds under management 
(Financial Services Council and Ernst and Young 2010). Other stakeholders 
participating in the survey included the Reserve Bank of Australia and a few 




The “informed estimates” of the participants in the survey (Financial Services Council 
and Ernst and Young 2010, p.7) were used as data rather than data from proper 
analysis of processes involved in the implementation and appropriate costing 
estimates. If such analysis was indeed done, it is not evident in the report and 
therefore an evaluation is not possible. Participants were asked to rate certain 
aspects of the proposed SuperStream based on their ‘opinion’. Examples of the 
questions asked include ‘the business relevance of SuperStream, ‘support for 
SuperStream tenets’, and ‘diversity of costs and benefits’ of SuperStream 
implementation. It appears that the responses of the participants to the latter group 
11 




It is quoted that “Our research indicates that the industry believes the benefits from 
SuperStream will be substantial. In a high level assessment of the benefits our 
research suggests the industry could save up to 25% of current administration costs. 
For a more than $1 trillion dollar industry this equates to $1 billion in annual savings, 
equating to over $20 billion in 2020 should assets under management continue to 




In the absence of any other explanation of how such figures have been arrived at, it 
can be concluded that the cost and saving estimates are purely opinion based, 
further highlighting the need for appropriate research of academic nature.  
 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The Cooper Committee, chaired by Jeremy Cooper, was commissioned to review 
the governance, efficiency, structure and operation of the superannuation system 
with the best interests of the members being the focus. The committee proposed 177 
recommendations in its final report, 139 of which were either accepted or accepted in 
principle by the government of the time. Two such recommendations have resulted 
in the most significant reforms in the superannuation industry since the introduction 
of the Superannuation Guarantee in 1992. Titled ‘MySuper’ and ‘SuperStream’, 
these reforms call for a compulsory transfer of superannuation funds in employer 
default funds into a new simple, low-cost fund and an upgrade of the back office 
services of superannuation administrators to a more computerised and streamlined 
system respectively.  
 
 
 To support the benefits of these major reforms two research reports have been 
commissioned and the results used by officials publicly. One report prepared by 
Deloitte Actuaries and Consultants estimated the approximate costs and savings 
resulting from the implementation of MySuper. The other report prepared by 
Financial Services Council (FSC) and Ernst & Young (2010), estimated the required 
initial cost and the resulting savings in operating costs of implementing SuperStream. 
 
 
Given the impact these reports have had on policy, this paper examines the basis of 
their projections using a qualitative assumption approach. It is concluded that the 
scope of these reports is limited and they are predominantly constrained to industry 
funds and are presented by interested players, limiting their ability for full 






1. Cooper committee was the panel of experts commissioned in 2009 to examine 
and analyse the governance, efficiency, structure and operation of Australia's 
superannuation system. The Chair of the Review was Jeremy Cooper, the 
former Deputy Chairman of ASIC. Jeremy was supported by a Panel of seven 
part-time members. Further details can be found at: 
http://www.supersystemreview.gov.au/content/the_review.aspx 
 
2. These findings were used by the government in its response to the Cooper 
committee recommendations to support their adoption of the proposed 
SuperStream. 
 
3. Choice of Fund legislation came into effect from 1 July 2005 allowing 
employees more flexibility and choice in their super fund options. From 1 July 
2005, employees have had the option of choosing the superannuation fund 
they wish to have their employer contributions invested in. 
 
4. The name of this report was not disclosed in the Deloitte 2010 report and 
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